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Response*
Tonderai W. Chikuhwa
If buttercups buzz’d after the bee,
If boats were on land, churches on sea,
If ponies rode men and if grass ate the cows,
And cats should be chased into holes by the mouse,
If the mamas sold their babies
To the gypsies for half a crown;
If summer were spring and the other way round,
Then all the world would be upside down.
—English Ballad
I. Introduction
In the past two decades we have witnessed fundamental, unprecedented, and deeply disturbing shifts in the trends and nature of armed
conflict. These changes have been characterized in particular by the targeting of civilian populations as a deliberate tactic of warfare. Whereas
civilians made up fewer than 5 percent of all casualties during World
War I, today 75 percent or more of those killed or wounded in wars are
noncombatants. The post-Cold War era has been marked by the proliferation of conflicts within states, conflicts in which age-old norms and
taboos are being broken. The most vulnerable—children, the elderly,
and women—have become the primary targets of state and non-state
parties to conflict. Not only are children most often in the direct line of
fire, more horrific still is that in many instances around the world, they
have also become the instruments of war, forced to give expression to
the hatreds of adults and to commit the very worst brutalities against
other children, their own families, and their communities. It is indeed a
world turned upside down.
Against this backdrop and in response, the international community in the past decade has made a concerted effort to elaborate a more
coherent protection and assistance framework for civilians in armed
conflict. This includes the establishment of several distinct agendas
for categories of persons considered especially vulnerable, such as a
*The views expressed herein are those of the author and do not necessarily
reflect the views of the United Nations.
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specific regime for the protection of children in wars, as well as a more
concerted focus on Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs).
For over a decade, Francis Deng has been a moral voice of conscience
on behalf of the internally displaced, pioneering the development of a
normative protection framework and advocacy agenda for IDPs. His
Roundtable essay, “Divided Nations: The Paradox of National Responsibility,” outlines the United Nations agenda for assistance and protection to IDPs, and in particular the advances in this area under the
mandate of the Representative of the United Nations Secretary-General for Internally Displaced Persons, an office occupied by Deng from
1992–2004. Deng’s essay traces the evolution of the agenda from the
earliest conversations leading to the establishment of the mandate and
role of the Representative of the Secretary-General, to the development
of a normative protection and assistance framework for IDPs and the
promotion and dissemination of the subsequent standards.
My essay examines and responds to Deng’s work. It identifies the
strengths and successes of the mandate of the Representative of the
Secretary-General for IDPs, namely, the development of a more coherent normative framework for IDPs, the forging of a stronger political
consensus on the internally displaced as well as a broadening of the
circle of stakeholders, and deeper analytical treatment of the IDP problematique. It examines Deng’s conceptual point of departure expressed
in the notion of “Sovereignty as Responsibility,” an idea that has
emerged as the United Nations doctrine known as the “Responsibility
to Protect.” Sovereignty as responsibility has represented the leitmotif
of Deng’s advocacy as Representative of the Secretary-General.
However, in critique, this analysis argues that while it has improved
the assistance response, the IDP agenda as defined under Deng’s mandate has not gone far enough to deliver tangible protection for the
internally displaced, particularly against direct acts of violence and
other overt human rights violations. In spite of the significant contributions made by Deng and the efforts of the international community,
the reality on the ground in terms of the numbers and the abuses being
committed against IDPs is catastrophic. Furthermore, the situation has
deteriorated progressively in the past decade. The essay argues that to
redress this imbalance between strong protection standards, on the one
hand, and the actual circumstances and plight of the most vulnerable
populations in situations of conflict, on the other hand, we must enter
what the United Nations Secretary-General has referred to as an “era
of application” of international standards. Essentially, the international
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community must begin to redirect its energies from the elaboration of
standards to ensuring their application on the ground.
This article argues for the need to balance the “carrot,” as exemplified by Deng’s central emphasis on diplomacy, dialogue, collaboration,
and assistance to national authorities to meet their protection responsibilities, with the “stick,” which entails the adoption, where necessary
and appropriate, of concrete and targeted measures to ensure that
governments (and indeed non-state parties) do not shirk their sovereign responsibility to protect those under their jurisdiction. In arguing
for and exploring this balance of carrot and stick, the essay outlines
schematically the advances of the past decade on a contiguous United
Nations agenda for the protection of children affected by armed conflict. It proposes that the experience of the international community
may be critical in terms of concretizing and advancing further the IDP
protection agenda.
My contribution examines Deng’s keystone concept of sovereignty
as responsibility, arguing that positive dialogue and diplomacy must
be reinforced by a structured regime of compliance, which would engender and enforce international protection standards. This would entail
the development of new institutional arrangements and infrastructure
as a framework for adoption of concrete and targeted sanction measures against state and non-state parties to conflict for cases in which
they systematically commit grave human rights violations.
The essay also contends that a critical liability inherent in Deng’s
idea of sovereignty as responsibility is the primacy afforded to dialogue with national authorities, without adequate acknowledgment,
consideration, or examination of the roles and responsibility of nonstate parties to conflict, which increasingly determine the lives of populations falling under their spheres of power.
This article concludes that the effectiveness of Deng’s work, and
ultimately his legacy on the IDP problem, will be viewed in the light of
tangible protection for vulnerable populations, that is to say, whether
we are able to enter an “era of application” of international protection
standards.
II. Displacement
Large-scale internal displacement continues to be one of the principal characteristics of conflict in the post-Cold War era. As defined by
the Guiding Principle on Internal Displacement, IDPs are “persons or
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groups of persons who have been forced or obliged to flee or to leave
their homes or places of habitual residence, in particular as a result of or
in order to avoid the effects of armed conflict, situations of generalized
violence, violations of human rights or natural or man-made disasters,
and who have not crossed an internationally recognized State border.”1
The assistance and protection of IDPs has been a preoccupation of the
United Nations for a number of years. However, the international community has focused more strategically and concertedly on this problem in the past decade through the mandate of the Representative of
the Secretary-General on IDPs and most recently in the framework of
the Secretary-General’s Protection of Civilians agenda.
While the global refugee population has dropped by 20 percent over
the past three years, the number of IDPs only declined by a modest 6
percent in 2005,2 this in spite of the resolution of longstanding conflicts
and significant return movements. Deng cites some 25 million people
in more than 50 countries as having been uprooted from their homes
and displaced within the boundaries of their countries as a consequence of violence, grave human rights violations, or environmental
disaster. In this global crisis, Africa is the most severely affected, with
over half of the world’s IDPs. Perhaps the most dramatic case in point
is Sudan, which currently represents the world’s worst crisis of internal
displacement. In Sudan, 4.5 million people have been displaced by war
in the south of the country and approximately 2 million in the region
of Darfur.3
The year 2006 saw a significant increase in IDP numbers with waves
of new displacements in many countries, including Sri Lanka, Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), and Sudan. Direct and systematic targeting of civilians, rapidly shifting conflicts, and restrictions on
humanitarian access have led to repeated cycles of displacement, as
witnessed for instance in Batticola district in Sri Lanka and in Darfur,
as well as in Colombia, where protracted conflict over several decades
has seen over six million people displaced, often several times, from
their homes. The United Nations Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) estimates that in at least twelve countries, six
million internally displaced people receive no assistance or protection
from their governments.
This snapshot of the global IDP crisis belies the concerted focus by
the international community in the past several years and makes the
most compelling case for my central argument: The present framework
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of protection for IDPs has not yet extended far enough toward the
application of international protection standards.
III. Elaboration of a Normative Framework for IDPs
The mandate of the Representative of the Secretary-General for IDPs
has sought to address the global crisis of internal displacement by raising the level of public awareness, filling some of the critical knowledge
gaps by fostering deeper analytical engagement on the problematique,
and forging a stronger consensus at the political level. These efforts
have been an important complement to the central project of developing a normative framework specifically for the assistance and protection of the internally displaced.
Deng initiated work on a normative framework on the basis of
an analytical report that the United Nations Secretary-General presented in 1991, which concluded that there was “no clear statement
of the human rights of internally displaced persons, or those at risk of
becoming displaced.” Therefore, the Secretary-General recommended
the elaboration of guidelines that would “[clarify] the implications of
existing human rights law for persons who are internally displaced
and [fashion] from existing standards one comprehensive, universally
applicable body of principles which addressed the main needs and
problems of such persons.”4 Deng suggests that the issue was in fact
not the non-existence of international norms providing for the protection of IDPs, but rather that these norms were broadly dispersed in
various instruments, and as such not accessible for effective advocacy
in the assistance and protection of the internally displaced. At the same
time, there were also gaps in the normative infrastructure that had to
be addressed. Accordingly, the initial phase of work of Deng and colleagues consisted of convening a technical process to assess the normative terrain, to take stock of the existing standards for the protection of
IDPs, and to propose areas for strengthening and where development
of additional norms would be necessary.
Ensuring a broad-based “buy-in” for this technical process would
be fundamental to the exercise. There was a need to build consensus among multiple stakeholders, including United Nations agencies,
funds, and programs; other prominent intergovernmental arrangements, such as the International Committee of the Red Cross; academia; and NGOs, whose concerted advocacy and pressure over the
preceding years had generated the necessary awareness leading to
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greater prioritization and more serious treatment of the IDP problematique by the international community. It was also critical to maintain
the integrity of the exercise by ensuring that it remained “grounded.”
In this regard, Deng’s deep and consistent engagement with local civil
society in conflict-affected countries, as well as with the internally displaced themselves, was crucial to the process.
As the technical exercise gained momentum, a simultaneous process
of political consensus building among U.N. member states was also
convened to secure their acceptance of the emerging normative framework. Ultimately, the success of the IDP agenda constructed around
the Guiding Principles would depend on the cooperation of governments and fostering a sense of ownership on their part. This becomes
more readily apparent upon examination of Deng’s conceptual point of
departure for the agenda, namely, the notion that the primary responsibility for ensuring assistance and protection of the internally displaced
resides with states as an aspect of their sovereignty.
Deng describes the Guiding Principles as follows:
The resulting Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement restate, interpret and apply standards from the human rights, humanitarian and
analogous refugee law. They are divided into four sections addressing
the protection against displacement, protection and assistance during
displacement, access to humanitarian assistance and return, resettlement, and reintegration. The Guiding Principles apply not only to states,
but also to ‘all other authorities, groups and persons in their relations
with internally displaced persons.’ This includes non-state actors, intergovernmental and nongovernmental organizations, and internally displaced persons themselves.

The added value, then, of the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement is that they centralize the existing norms for assistance and protection of IDPs, and also contribute to closing gaps in the normative
protection infrastructure for the internally displaced. Combined with
stronger political consensus and more rigorous analytical treatment of
the IDP issue, it is evident that the initiative has yielded some important practical dividends, such as an improvement in the assistance
response for IDPs. We have witnessed amelioration in the level of
humanitarian support services for the internally displaced in the provision of basic life necessities, such as food, shelter, and clothing. The
international community is expending more resources on assistance
for IDPs than ever before, including through the newly established
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Central Emergency Relief Fund (CERF), administered by OCHA. The
CERF has been critical, especially in terms of more timely response to
complex humanitarian emergencies.
However, Deng’s agenda for IDPs is not yet an adequate framework
for improved protection response, especially in the face of purposive
targeting of displaced populations for serious human rights violations,
including killing and maiming, rape and other grave sexual violence,
and overt denial of humanitarian access for IDPs. Also increasingly
evident is that IDP camps have become prime recruiting grounds for
child soldiers. Thus, the protection agenda under Deng’s mandate has
not extended far enough, especially in terms of proposing and developing a structured regime for engendering compliance with international protection standards or fostering institutional arrangements
to this end. This dimension—a structured compliance regime—is a
critical element for the redirection of emphasis from the elaboration of
standards to their application on the ground. Ultimately, the effectiveness of the agenda will be gauged by the ability of the international
community to deliver adequate and timely humanitarian assistance to
IDPs, but also in terms of tangible protection from systematic acts of
violence and other human rights violations.
IV. Liabilities of “Sovereignty as Responsibility”5
As noted earlier, Deng’s conceptual point of departure in developing
the IDP agenda has been to reinforce the notion of national sovereignty
as a positive concept of the responsibility of states to protect their citizens or individuals falling under their jurisdiction, particularly under
circumstances of internal conflict. This translated into his conception
of Sovereignty as Responsibility, articulated as follows:
State sovereignty implies responsibility, and the primary responsibility for the protection of its people lies with the state itself. Where a
population is suffering serious harm, as a result of internal war, insurgency, repression or state failure, and the state in question is unwilling
or unable to halt or avert it, the principle of non-interference yields to the
international responsibility to protect.6

Deng’s analytical starting point is an understanding of the changing
order as a consequence of the end of the Cold War and the global bipolar power arrangement that marked that period. As the prevailing
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status quo disintegrated and American and Soviet support for their
allies around the globe began to dissipate, the world witnessed the proliferation of conflicts within states. Deng suggests that countries that
had been able to suppress or manage conflict with the support of the
superpowers were no longer able to do so effectively, or to deal with
the serious humanitarian consequences of conflict. Intra-state conflict
has resulted in a dramatic rise in the number of internally displaced.
As the humanitarian situation around the world deteriorated with the
end of the Cold War, Deng suggests that there was greater “pressure”
on the notion that sovereignty may be invoked by states as “a barricade
against international scrutiny.” Deng asserts that this shift in the global
order has resulted in a new consciousness, namely, that “Human rights
and humanitarian concerns [have begun] to replace strategic national
interest as the driving norm in international politics.” Therefore, the
end of the Cold War represented a critical turning point toward a new
and more acute consciousness of human rights in general and the
plight of the internally displaced in particular, leading to the genesis of
the concerted international response to internal displacement.
The central emphasis of Deng’s advocacy has been on “diplomacy
and the art of persuasion” as a means to compel national authorities to
ensure assistance and protection of IDPs and to overcome humanitarian access restrictions imposed by states in the name of sovereignty. He
implies that states have a fundamental sense of responsibility towards
their citizens, and as such there is always an inherent receptivity on the
part of national authorities to cooperate with the international community to address the plight of IDPs. This receptivity of states represents
an entry point for dialogue on assistance and protection. The approach
is also based in part on the assumption that for many governments,
legitimization by the international community is a powerful incentive
for good behavior, and dialogue on relief and protection of IDPs may
be viewed as a vehicle to international legitimacy, or at least as valuable political capital. They may perceive the price of negative global
public opinion or other international censure as a significant liability
for their national interests. This also represents an entry point for dialogue and diplomacy.
To emphasize his point regarding the receptivity of states, Deng
notes that in his extensive diplomatic engagements as an advocate for
IDPs, “no government authority has ever argued, ‘I don’t care how
irresponsible or irresponsive we are, this is an internal matter and none
of your business.’” He argues that there exist “vacuums of responsibil-
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ity” in which IDPs fall as a consequence of governments distancing
themselves from their obligations, but that this is often due to their lack
of capacity to deal with overwhelming humanitarian crises. For Deng,
these vacuums may be addressed through dialogue, diplomacy, and
offers of assistance to governments by the international community, in
order to enable national authorities to assume their responsibility.
It is evident that this approach provides critical relief to millions
of IDPs around the world. However, specific cases also testify to the
fact that there are indeed governments that are “irresponsible” or
unresponsive, and situations in which grave human rights violations
against IDPs are occurring through deliberate inaction, or with direct
complicity, or even under explicit directions from national authorities.
Such governments may often couch their dialogue with the international community in “diplomatically/politically correct” human rights
language, while at the same time purposefully pursuing domestic policies and practices that violate the most fundamental human rights
tenets. For example, in their dialogue with the United Nations, some
of the most notorious governments that recruit and use child soldiers
stress the fact that they have ratified the Optional Protocol to the
Convention on the Rights of the Child. Since this prohibits underage
recruitment into the armed forces, it means that they therefore do not
condone such activity. Yet in every practical sense they have not met
this commitment, including the lack of commensurate reform by their
national legislation to criminalize the practice of recruitment or to rigorously investigate and prosecute at the national level individuals in
their armed forces who recruit children. They “look the other way” or
are directly complicit because it suits what they view as their national
interests.
Therefore, even though we are indeed entering an era of greater
global consciousness and scrutiny on human rights issues, it overstates
the case to suggest that human rights and humanitarian concerns are
replacing strategic national interest as the driving norm of international politics, as is argued by Deng. I would propose that states are
as single-minded as ever about their national interests, but due to
external pressures they have become more adept at making the right
human rights noises to cover violations. That is to say, governments
have developed an increasingly sophisticated human rights lexicon
and rhetoric, and this, combined with invocations of sovereignty, has
become a formidable barrier to meaningful international intervention
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where cynical policies are being pursued against vulnerable groups
including IDPs.
It is important to stress that the critical liability of Deng’s approach
lies not in sovereignty as responsibility as a conceptual leitmotif, but
rather in the lack of a strategic approach and framework (beyond
advocacy and dissemination of norms, and assistance and protection
dialogue) to translate this concept into tangible protection for the most
vulnerable in situations of armed conflict. Diplomacy in the spirit of
goodwill, responsibility, and constructive dialogue can only achieve
positive results when concerned governments are also prepared to
deal in this spirit. Where one is faced with irresponsible and unresponsive interlocutors, diplomacy requires a different set of pressure tools
and possibilities, essentially to be able to present a credible threat of
sanctions against violating parties to compel them to take responsibility and alter behavior and practice.
Building a regime of compliance with international protection standards is precisely about generating the necessary political will. It means
devising institutional arrangements and infrastructure to be able to
adopt concrete and targeted measures against recalcitrant violators of
human rights. In other words, the IDP protection agenda must have
“teeth” in order to incentivize responsible behavior. In the absence
of a compliance regime, the realities on the ground will continue to
belie the high level of commitment of the international community
as expressed in the extensive normative protection infrastructure that
presently exists. The fact that Deng has not explored this dimension in
his work represents a critical liability.
V. Considering Non-State Parties to Conflict
A second liability inherent in sovereignty as responsibility as a conceptual underpinning is that it privileges the state as the interlocutor in
assistance and protection dialogue and diplomacy. Deng’s disproportionate emphasis on governments is conspicuous and unsustainable
because in many intra-state conflicts today non-state parties, including
rebel groups and other armed forces, are powerful determinants of
the lives of people living under their effective control. Furthermore,
these parties often commit the most heinous acts of violence against
those civilian populations. For instance, in Sudan, a plethora of nonstate armed forces, including nomadic groups often referred to as
Janjaweed, are committing grave human rights violations, including
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systematic rape of girls around IDP camps in Darfur. The Revolutionary United Front rebels in Sierra Leone, infamous for acts of brutality
including killing and maiming civilians and systematic recruitment
of children, at certain points during ten years of conflict effectively
controlled the entire country save for the capital, Freetown. The FARC
rebels in Colombia are in control of a vast portion of that country, as
are the Tamil Tigers in Sri Lanka, and both groups commit human
rights abuses against civilians in their territories of control. The Forces
Nouvelle rebel group in Côte d’Ivoire controls the northern half of the
country. The list goes on.
The issue of negotiations with non-state armed groups is an emerging discourse within the United Nations, and a vexing one at that.
Some voices, particularly on the political side, carry reservations about
treating with non-state armed groups because this may be perceived as
tacit recognition and the conferral of legitimacy on parties that may be
categorized as illegal or terrorist organizations. Others, particularly on
the humanitarian side, insist that the assistance and protection imperative should override other considerations and that the United Nations
should seek to engage both state and non-state actors in protection dialogue. Realistically and practically, non-state parties must necessarily
form part of the calculus of a viable assistance and protection agenda
for IDPs.
VI. Issue of Leverage
The question becomes how to deal with actors who are not signatories
to international protection treaties and conventions and as such do
not carry sovereign responsibility in the same sense as a legitimate
national authority. What incentives can be offered to non-state parties? Or what disincentives can be put in place to prevent their abuses?
I would suggest that in an emerging order increasingly defined by
interconnectedness and globalization, the international community
has unprecedented possibilities and opportunities to leverage nonstate parties.
The information revolution has made it increasingly difficult for
those who commit grave violations to insulate themselves from scrutiny and the court of international public opinion and pressure. For
many non-state groups who have political agendas and aspirations
(and the vast majority of them do), the public image that they project
is of vital importance. The Tamil Tigers, for instance, rely on extensive
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diaspora networks in North America and Europe for advocacy and
financial support to their cause. Their capacity to operate effectively
depends on access to global financial institutions and mechanisms.
In the Democratic Republic of the Congo, for example, armed groups
depend on global markets for illicitly exploited natural resources such
as diamonds, timber, and coltan, in order to convert such resources into
weapons and other “inputs” for conflict. They depend on satellite connections and cellular networks to coordinate their military and public
relations campaigns. The leaders and spokespeople of these groups
often need to travel internationally to sustain their operations. All
these aspects represent pressure points that may be targeted through a
structured compliance regime.
Today, as never before, it is possible to raise the stakes and risk
level for those who commit grave human rights violations because the
means exist to institute targeted measures to sanction them. It is now
largely a matter of generating the requisite political will within the
international community for such action. There are encouraging indications that such will already exists.
VII. Compliance Regime for Children Affected by Armed Conflict7
In the past several years remarkable progress has been made in the
structuring of a regime of monitoring, reporting, and compliance with
international standards in the context of a contiguous agenda for the
protection of children affected by armed conflict. This progress is schematically outlined here as a basis for consideration in terms of the
extension of the IDP protection agenda.
Strategically and tactically, the objective of the mandate of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children and Armed
Conflict has been to locate this issue at the highest discussion table of
the United Nations, by inscribing it on the peace and security agenda
of the Organization. Within the ten-year existence of the mandate, the
Security Council has adopted six resolutions focusing explicitly on
the plight of war-affected children. This undertaking and the achievements that have been registered thus far are unprecedented. The initial resolution of the Security Council on children and armed conflict,
Resolution 1261, adopted in 1999, represents the very first resolution of
the Council on a thematic human rights issue. It opened the door for
the engagement of the Security Council on a range of other thematic
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concerns, including Women, Peace and Security and the Protection of
Civilians in Armed Conflict.
Each of the five subsequent resolutions of the Security Council
on children and armed conflict since then—1314 (2000), 1379 (2001),
1460 (2002), 1539 (2004) and 1612 (2005)—have elaborated a framework for the protection of children in situations of armed conflict, and
have gradually focused on one specific aspect, namely, the systematic
monitoring and reporting of particularly egregious violations against
children as well as engendering compliance with international child
protection standards to end impunity for these violations. It is important to note that the project has focused on all parties to conflicts who
commit violations, both state and non-state actors.
The latest resolution, Resolution 1612, effectively operationalizes
the engagement of the Security Council by mandating the implementation of institutional arrangements and an infrastructure for compliance. Resolution 1612 requests the Secretary-General to implement a
mechanism to systematically monitor and report to the Council grave
violations, including the annual preparation by the Secretary-General
of a “naming and shaming” list of specific state and non-state parties
to conflict who recruit and use child soldiers. The list also records
five other grave violations: killing or maiming of children, rape or
other sexual violence, abduction of children, attacks against schools
or hospitals, and denial of humanitarian access for children. Resolution 1612 also establishes a dedicated Security Council Working Group
on Children and Armed Conflict to continuously review information
emanating from the monitoring mechanisms, and on the basis of this
information recommend targeted measures that may be undertaken by
the Security Council and other policy-level bodies against violators, as
well as for programmatic response for war-affected children. Finally,
the Resolution also requests that the parties to conflict engage in dialogue with the United Nations to prepare concrete and time-bound
action plans to end the recruitment and use of child soldiers and to
release to the United Nations and child protection NGOs all children
associated with their forces in any capacity.
In effect, the Security Council has now put in place an infrastructure
through which child protection actors are able to seize the attention of
the Council on issues related to war-affected children on an “as needed
basis,” as well as a referral arrangement for action against recalcitrant
violators. The annual report of the Secretary-General serves as a gate-
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way and framework for the Security Council’s engagement on the issue
and as a vehicle for the compliance regime that has been instituted.
A year after adoption of Resolution 1612, this institutional arrangement and infrastructure has begun to yield tangible results in terms
of protection for children. Parties to conflict perceive that the risk
level for committing violations against children has risen appreciably
because the Security Council has clearly demonstrated the political
will to address impunity, and in a practical sense has organized itself
to take concrete action. As a result, a number of parties to conflict
have engaged the United Nations in dialogue for the preparation of
child protection action plans, including the Forces Nouvelle as well as
four pro-government militia groups in Côte d’Ivoire, who signed such
plans in November 2005 and December 2006, respectively. This has
resulted in the identification and release, so far, of some 1,400 children
by the Forces Nouvelle.
The government of Uganda also committed to an action plan to
end recruitment and use of children in their forces following a visit of
the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children and
Armed Conflict in July 2006. Other parties, such as the Tamil Tigers in
Sri Lanka as well as parties to the conflict in Myanmar, have also signaled their commitment to establish dialogue with the United Nations
in the framework of Resolution 1612. Parties in Myanmar recently
signed a formal Deed of Commitment on critical child protection concerns.
In February 2006, the Security Council Sanctions Committee for Côte
d’Ivoire established, pursuant to Resolution 1572 (2004), an approved
list of individuals subject to specific sanctions, including a travel ban
and attachment of financial assets. Commandant Martin Kouakou
Fofie of Force Nouvelles was listed under the citation that forces under
his command had engaged in recruitment of child soldiers, abductions, and sexual abuse and exploitation of children. Since then, the
Security Council Working Group on Children and Armed Conflict has
recommended to the Council, amongst other specific conclusions, the
referral to the existing Security Council Sanctions Committees of cases
of continued grave violations against children by parties in the Democratic Republic of Congo and Côte d’Ivoire.
The concerted engagement of the Security Council on the children
and armed conflict protection agenda over the past ten years has contributed significantly to a powerful momentum for an “era of application” of international child protection standards and other concrete
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actions by entities beyond the Security Council. For example, in March
2006, the Chief Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court issued
a statement announcing the first indictment of the Court, of Thomas
Lubanga, founder and leader of a militia group in Ithuri in the Democratic Republic of Congo, for commission of war crimes: conscripting
and enlisting children under the age of fifteen years, and using children to participate actively in hostilities. In his statement, the Prosecutor sounded a clear message of intent regarding impunity for crimes
against children:
This is the first case, not the last. The investigation is ongoing, we will
continue to investigate more crimes committed by Thomas Lubanga
Dyilo and we will also investigate other crimes committed by other
groups. This is important, it’s a sequence. We will investigate crimes
committed by other militias and other persons—this is the first case, not
the last… . We are totally committed to staying in Congo—to make sure
justice is done.8

Also in March 2006, Major Jean-Pierre Biyoyo became the first person
to be convicted in a national judicial process for recruiting child soldiers. He was sentenced to five years imprisonment by a military tribunal in the Democratic Republic of Congo.9
The former President of Liberia, Charles Taylor, was transferred into
the custody of the Special Court for Sierra Leone on 17 March 2006, and
indicted on eleven counts of war crimes and crimes against humanity.
These included, “conscripting or enlisting children under the age of 15
years into armed forces or groups, or using them to participate actively
in hostilities.”10 He is the first former Head of State to be held explicitly
accountable for child recruitment.
The remarkable precedent that has been set on the children and
armed conflict agenda represents a valuable “lessons-learned and best
practices” experience, and carries distinct possibilities for moving into
an era of the application of international standards in the context of the
IDP agenda. Continued leadership, commitment, and vision is required
to ensure that the international community makes good on the paper
promises that have been made to protect vulnerable groups.
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VIII. Conclusion
The role of the United Nations as custodian and principal advocate for
international norms and standards for the protection of the most vulnerable is one of the most critical responsibilities of the Organization.
In the past decade, we have witnessed the elaboration of an unprecedented array of protection standards. As a result, today our normative
infrastructure for protection is more extensive, coherent, and robust
than ever before. However, in spite of the broad-based commitment to
the principles enshrined in international protection standards, parties
to conflict have increasingly demonstrated a willful disregard for the
most basic tenets of international humanitarian law. For the United
Nations to remain relevant into the future it must lead the redirection
of the energies and emphasis of the international community from
the elaboration of norms to their application on the ground. This will
require the political will to develop new institutional arrangements
and infrastructures for concrete and targeted measures against those
who commit egregious human rights violations.
Under the leadership of Francis Deng, important progress has been
made on the specific agenda for assistance and protection of the internally displaced. However, in order to more effectively deliver protection to this particular category of vulnerable people, the agenda must
now enter a new territory in which a structured regime to ensure
compliance with the applicable normative framework is elaborated. In
the end, the work of Dr. Deng in this area will be viewed in the context
of how effectively norms and strong political consensus are translated
into tangible protection for vulnerable human beings.
Since 1999, the United Nations Secretary-General, together with the
Security Council, has pushed the boundaries in terms of engendering
compliance with protection standards in the context of his agenda for
children affected by armed conflict. He has sought to position this
critical issue centrally on the stage of international peace and security.
The concerted and purposive engagement of the Security Council has
now begun to translate into real improvements in the lives of children.
Experience and inspiration may be drawn from this unprecedented
advancement.
Specific examples of actions taken by different actors at the international level demonstrate that the necessary political will to address
impunity for crimes against the most vulnerable groups can indeed
be generated. The efforts of various actors, each in the scope of their
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distinct mandates, roles, and jurisdictions, are gradually increasing the
pressure on those who commit violations. It is clear that these parties
“are sitting up and taking notice.” A distinct window of opportunity
exists for the international community to press home the advantage.
Advocacy for an era of application of international protection standards is no longer merely a utopian project.
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